Federalism, Elections, Preemption, and Supremacy: The Aftermath of Inter Tribal Council by Floyd, Graham August Toney
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 2 Vol. 33 Iss. 2 Article 7 
2015 
Federalism, Elections, Preemption, and Supremacy: The 
Aftermath of Inter Tribal Council 
Graham August Toney Floyd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
33 Miss. C. L. Rev. 235 (2014-2015) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
FEDERALISM, ELECTIONS, PREEMPTION,
AND SUPREMACY:
THE AFTERMATH OF INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL
Graham August Toney Floyd*
ABSTRACT
This Note examines Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, a recent United
States Supreme Court case dealing with the constitutionality of an Arizona
voter identification law. The law required Arizona election officials to re-
ject any application to register to vote that was not accompanied by satis-
factory evidence of United States citizenship. The Supreme Court held that
Arizona's law conflicted with, and was therefore preempted by, the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act, but was quick to acknowledge States' rights
in the area of elections. Inter Tribal raises interesting issues regarding the
extent of federal and state power regarding elections, as well as the Elec-
tions Clause and the Supremacy Clause. This case is not limited to Arizona.
Rather, Inter Tribal will prove to shape elections, as well as voting rights
and procedures nationwide in the immediate future.
PART I: INTRODUCTION
Picture it: a clash' between federal and state law involving voter regis-
tration and identification. Can these laws coexist? Can a State have its
own scheme regulating state elections while the federal government regu-
lates federal elections? Should the Supremacy Clause2 or the Elections
Clause3 govern the analysis? Should a state election law that conflicts with
a federal election law always be preempted? Would this usurp the author-
ity of the States? These questions were recently addressed by the Supreme
Court in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona.4 All justices of the
Court affirmed the principle that States can impose their own respective
voter qualifications in both federal and state elections.5 However, the
* J.D. Candidate, 2015. I would like to express my utmost gratitude to Professor Bradley A.
Smith, Professor Mark R. Brown, Professor Janet George Blocher, Judge Teresa L. Liston, ret., Judge
Robert A. Burnside, Jr., my mother, Mona Wilson Floyd, Mona Sprague, and the editors and staff of
the Mississippi College Law Review. This Note would not have been possible without all of their
collective support and guidance. The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily
represent the views of these respective persons or publication.
1. This Note will argue that such a clash existed in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). See infra Part IV.A.
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
4. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
5. Id. at 2257-60 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII; Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 210 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Id. at 2261
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Id. at 2263 ("Congress has no role in
setting voter qualifications, or determining whether they are satisfied, aside from the powers conferred
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Court further held that when a state voter registration and identification
law conflicts with a federal law regarding how federal elections are held,
the state law is preempted by the federal law under the Elections Clause.6
The purpose of this Note is to argue that regulations' addressing the
fundamental right to vote should be analyzed according to the principles of
federalism: when, where, and how, or the "manner" in which federal elec-
tions are held should be determined by Congress pursuant to the Elections
Clause, while States should be given leeway when deciding who may vote
in federal and state elections pursuant to the Voter Qualifications Clause
and the Seventeenth Amendment, as held by all justices of the Court. Of
course, States must comply with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, section 2 of The Voting
Rights Act,' and the Court's holding in Crawford v. Marion County Elec-
tion Board.9
Part II of this Note contains a general background discussion of rele-
vant statutes and cases leading up to Inter Tribal. Part III discusses the
facts immediately leading up to Inter Tribal, the procedural history of Inter
Tribal, and the various positions taken by the members of the Court in the
Inter Tribal case. Part IV analyzes the Court's decision by taking a more
in-depth look at the Supremacy Clause, the Elections Clause, and the opin-
ions of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. This Note will argue
that even given the valid respective points raised by Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, the majority was correct to accept Justice Scalia's posi-
tion notwithstanding its deficiencies. Part V discusses the significance of
Inter Tribal by pointing out its practical implications and its anticipated
impact on future cases by mentioning the possibility that a portion of a
prior decision by the Court has been repudiated. This part also presents
the reader with interesting hypotheticals applying the rule articulated in
Inter Tribal. This Note concludes with Part VI, which summarizes all main
points and argues that Justice Scalia was correct in finding that Arizona's
law was preempted.1 °
by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments .... This
power is instead expressly reposed in the States") (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 2273 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing): see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965));
see also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675 n.4 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
6. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
7. Including, but certainly not limited to, voter identification laws.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
9. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
10. An in-depth analysis of voter identification laws is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather,
this Note examines broader, far more pressing and fascinating questions regarding federalism and the
scope of federal and state power present in Inter Tribal. For an overview of recent voter identification
and election law litigation, see The Ohio State University, Election Law at Moritz, (June 25, 2014, 2:15
PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/.
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PART II: BACKGROUND
A. The National Voter Registration Act1
In 1993, pursuant to its power to regulate the time, place, and manner
of federal elections under the Elections Clause,12 Congress passed The Na-
tional Voter Registration Act ("NVRA") to assist would-be voters in regis-
tering to vote and to protect the integrity of the election process.13 Under
the NVRA, one way voters can register to vote in federal elections is by
using a uniform, national "federal form" through the mail. 4 The Election
Advisory Commission, ("EAC"), in consultation with "the chief election
officers of the States," developed such form pursuant to the NVRA.' 5 The
NVRA requires state agencies to "accept and use"' 6 the federal form when
registering voters for federal elections.' 7 The federal form only requires
that a voter swear, under penalty of perjury, that he or she is a United
States Citizen.1 8 The form "may require only such identifying informa-
tion ... as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to
assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration
and other parts of the election process.' 1 920  Further, the federal form
"may not include any requirement for notarization or other formal
authentication."
2 1
The NVRA is, by its very name, a law regulating voter registration-it
does not affect state elections or States' voter qualification laws.22 Indeed,
States are still charged with enforcing their own respective voter qualifica-
tions under state law.23 In fact, the NVRA permits a State to request the
EAC to include state-specific instructions on the federal form for the pur-
pose of enforcing its voter qualification requirements. 24 Further, the
NVRA allows States to create their own specific voter registration form in
order to register voters for both federal and state elections, so long as they
still accept and use the federal form and the state form conforms to the
framework for the contents of the federal form.25
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006).
12. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2251, 2253 (2013); Gonzalez v.
Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 403 (9th Cir. 2012), aff d sub nom. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,




16. Remember this phrase. It plays a pivotal role in Inter Tribal. What could it mean? Could it




20. Is a mere oath enough to prove United States citizenship? Who should make this call? The
States? The courts? The federal government? See infra Part V.
21. § 1973gg-7(b)(3).
22. Ass'n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995).
23. Id.
24. § 1973gg-7(a)(2); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2259 (2013).
25. § 1973gg-4(a)(2); § 1973gg-7(b); Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2255.
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B. The Help America Vote Act26
In response to the 2000 presidential election, 7 Congress passed the
Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") in 2002, which complemented the
NVRA. 28 HAVA requires, among other things, that voters provide an ID
when registering for a federal election.2 9 This requirement can be satisfied
by the applicant's current and valid driver's license number. If the appli-
cant does not have a current and valid driver's license number, the appli-
cant can provide a valid social security number.3" If an applicant has
neither a valid driver's license number nor a social security number, a state
is required to assign the voter an identification number. Additionally,
HAVA requires that States verify that the information the voter provided
on his or her voter registration satisfies HAVA's requirements under state
law.31 Further, HAVA establishes minimum requirements; States may still
establish election technology and administer requirements that are stricter
than HAVA, so long as they are not inconsistent with the federal require-
ments under HAVA or the NVRA, among other laws.323 3
C. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
34
Crawford provides the "test" for determining whether or not a voter
identification law is facially constitutional under the United States Consti-
tution. 36 Although this case is a plurality decision, a majority of the jus-
tices agreed to a "balancing test" to determine whether a voter
identification law is constitutional.37 Crawford involved an Indiana statute
requiring voters to present photo identification for voting. 38 Justice Ste-
vens wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy.39 Justice Stevens held that "a court must identify and
evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the bur-
den imposed by its rule, and then make the 'hard judgment' that our adver-
sary system demands."40 Justice Stevens found a minimal burden on the
26. 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2006).
27. Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 552 F.3d. 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2008).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 15484 (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 15545(a) (2002); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383,
402 (9th Cir. 2012).
29. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i); Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 402.
30. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i); Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 402.
31. § 15483 (a)(5)(A)(ii); Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 402.
32. § 15484; § 15545(a); Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 402.
33. For HAVA's role in Inter Tribal, see infra Part IV.A.
34. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
35. Id. at 190 (plurality opinion).
36. The reader will soon learn that Crawford is very much distinguishable from Inter Tribal. This
case is introduced here for context. See infra Part IV.
37. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion), 209 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 185 (plurality opinion).
39. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion that was joined by Jus-
tices Thomas and Alito. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring). This opinion is not material to this Note.
Additionally, Justice Souter dissented and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Souter would have held that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional under the bal-
ancing test. Id.
40. Id. at 190 (plurality opinion) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)).
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right to vote, as Indiana provided the photo identification cards to voters
for free.4" Justice Stevens further found that the inconvenience of making
a trip to an Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles office, the gathering of re-
quired documents to obtain the free photo identification card, and the pos-
ing for a photograph did not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to
vote or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.42
PART III: INTER TRIBAL
A. Facts Immediately Leading Up to Inter Tribal
In November 2004, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200, a law
designed to address alleged illegal voting and fraudulent voter registra-
tions.43 Arizona requires that a person must be a United States citizen in
order to qualify to vote.44 As a method of enforcing this, Proposition 200
required Arizona's election officials to "reject any application for registra-
tion that is not accompanied by satisfactory evidence" of United States citi-
zenship.45 Under Proposition 200, such evidence included: (1) a photocopy
of the applicant's passport or birth certificate; (2) a driver's license number,
provided that the license indicates that the issuing state verified that the
applicant was a United States Citizen; (3) naturalization evidence; (4) tribal
identification, or (5) "[o]ther documents or methods of proof . . . estab-
lished pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. "46
Since the EAC denied Arizona's request to include this requirement on the
state-specific instruction to the federal form, the NVRA form only requires
that applicants swear, under penalty of perjury, that they comply with Ari-
zona's voting requirements, but does not actually require the evidence of
citizenship that Arizona demands.4748
B. Procedural History
In 2006, a group of Arizona citizens and a group of Native Americans
filed separate suits against the state of Arizona challenging the validity of
the law.49 The trial court consolidated these cases and denied the plaintiffs'
motions for a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit then enjoined
Proposition 200 pending appeal, which was later vacated, and the case was
41. Id. at 198.
42. Id.
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-166(F) (2006), invalidated by Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2252
(2013) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006) (per curiam)).
44. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2252 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16
(2006)).
45. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN § 16-166(F).
46. Id.
47. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2252.
48. Are these laws consistent with one another?
49. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2252. Jesus Gonzalez was the lead plaintiff, and the Native Ameri-
cans composed a group of nonprofit organizations that were led by the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona.
50. Id.; Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Gonzalez I] (the
plaintiffs originally claimed, among other things, that Proposition 200 constituted a poll tax under the
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remanded by the Supreme Court.51 On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction as to the claim that the
NVRA preempts Proposition 200's registration rules.52 The trial court then
granted Arizona's motion for summary judgment on this claim, finding that
the NVRA did not preempt Proposition 200.5' A Ninth Circuit panel re-
versed, as relevant here, holding that the Arizona law conflicts with the
NVRA.54 This was later affirmed by an en banc Ninth Circuit. Arizona
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.56
C. Majority Holding
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit 57 with Justice Scalia writing for the majority.58 Justice Scalia began
his analysis by discussing the Elections Clause, noting that the Elections
Clause charges the States with selecting the time, place, and manner of
federal elections. 59  He further noted that Congress can opt to alter or
amend such selections through preemption at any time.60 Adhering to his
originalist philosophy, Scalia noted that the Elections Clause was designed
to redress the Framers' fear that States would refuse to hold federal elec-
tions.61 Thus, the simple question in this case, according to Justice Scalia,
was: whether Proposition 200, a state law prescribing the manner of federal
elections, was inconsistent with the NVRA, a law that was passed pursuant
to Congress' power under the Elections Clause.62 Justice Scalia stated that
if Proposition 200 were found to conflict with the NVRA, the Arizona law
must "give way."
63
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the phrase "accept and use" in the
NVRA could be interpreted in two different ways: (1) States must accept
the federal form as an adequate registration application, or (2) States must
Twenty-Fourth Amendment; that the law imposed a severe burden on the right to vote; that the law
burdened naturalized citizens disproportionately; and that the law was preempted by the NVRA).
51. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2252 (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2006) (per
curiam)).
52. Id (citing Gonzalez I, 485 F.3d at 1050-51).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2253 (citing Gonzalez v. Arizona, 624 F.3d 1162, 1181 (9th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Gon-
zalez II]).
55. Id (citing Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 403 (9th Cir. 2012)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2260.
58. Id. at 2251 (Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kennedy (in part)).
59. Id. at 2253 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804-05 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)).
60. Id. at 2253-54 (citing Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
392 (1880)).
61. Id. at 2253 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 362-63 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (emphasis omitted)).
62. Id. at 2254.
63. Id. at 2257.
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use the form to some extent in the registration process. 64 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that merely using the form to some extent "seems out of place in the
context of an official mandate to accept and use something for a given pur-
pose. The implication of such a mandate is that its object is to be ac-
cepted as sufficient for the requirement it is meant to satisfy. ' 65 Employing
his textualism, Justice Scalia further noted that neighboring provisions of
the NVRA require States to register eligible applicants to vote in an elec-
tion, provided that the applicant's "valid voter registration form" is post-
marked within a certain number of days before an election.66 Justice Scalia
dismissed Arizona's contention that § 1973gg-4(a)(1) of the NVRA allows
it to reject the federal form if a voter does not attach additional informa-
tion required to comply with state law, as such a reading would imply that
the federal form is invalid.67 According to Justice Scalia, it would defy
logic for Congress to pass a law providing for the creation of a form that is
invalid under the law in which it was created.68
Justice Scalia then turned to Arizona's attempt to apply a Supremacy
Clause analysis to what he dubbed an Elections Clause case.6 9 Justice
Scalia noted that the Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence has occa-
sionally employed a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law.7" Justice Scalia further noted that the Court has never used the
presumption against preemption principle in Election Clause cases.71
Scalia reasoned that each time Congress legislates under its Elections
Clause power, "it necessarily displaces some element of a pre-existing legal
regime erected by the States.
'7
Turning to Arizona's contention that its version of what "accept and
use" should mean in order to enforce its constitutional authority to estab-
lish voter qualifications, Justice Scalia acknowledged that if a federal stat-
ute prevented a state from gathering the information necessary to enforce
its voter qualifications, such statute would likely not pass constitutional
muster.73 Citing to the Voter Qualifications Clause, the Seventeenth
Amendment, as well as the Framers' original intent, Justice Scalia held that
while "the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal
elections are held," it is for the States to decide "who may vote in them.""
Justice Scalia declined to adopt Arizona's interpretation of the NVRA,
noting that the federal form can only require enough information to allow
64. Id. at 2254 (emphasis added).
65. Id. Justice Scalia further noted that many federal statues contain similar "shall accept" man-
dates that do not make willing receipt optional. Id. at 2254-55.
66. Id. at 2255 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis omitted)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2256.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2257.
73. Id. at 2258-59.
74. Id. at 2257-58 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961)).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
the States "to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter
registration and other parts of the election process.
75
Although Justice Scalia held that the NVRA preempted Proposition
200, he noted that Arizona could always renew its request to the EAC to
include its evidence of citizenship requirement in the state-specific instruc-
tions on the federal form so that it could enforce its voter qualifications.
76
Justice Scalia noted that if the EAC denied Arizona's request, Arizona may
challenge such denial under the Administrative Procedure Act. 7778
D. Concurrence
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment of the Court, which took issue with the Court's discussion
regarding the Supremacy Clause.7 9 Justice Kennedy criticized the majority
for holding that a hierarchy exists for federal powers such that courts are
required to use different preemption rules.80 Justice Kennedy argued that
courts should not "give an unduly broad interpretation to ambiguous or
imprecise language Congress uses. . . "[Courts] must confine their opin-
ions to avoid overextending a federal statute's preemptive reach." 81 Justice
Kennedy concluded by agreeing with the Court that the NVRA preempted
Proposition 200.82
E. Dissent
Justices Thomas and Alito each filed separate dissenting opinions.8 1
Justice Thomas would have held that the Seventeenth Amendment, as well
as the Voter Qualifications Clause, allows States to not only establish voter
qualifications but also to determine whether or not such qualifications have
been satisfied."4 He would have read the phrase "accept and use" to only
require Arizona to use the federal form "as a part of its voter registration
75. Id. at 2259 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7(b)(1) (2006)).
76. Id. at 2259-60.
77. Id. at 2259 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2006)).
78. Under federal law, the EAC is required to have at least three of its commissioners approve
any of its actions under 42 U.S.C. § 15328 (2006). The Commission currently has no active commission-
ers. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2260 n.10. However, the EAC recently determined that its Executive
Director had the authority to act on the Commission's behalf pursuant to an internal policy delegating
commissioner authority as relevant here to the Executive Director. Elections Assistance Comm'n, MEM-
ORANDUM OF DECISION CONCERNING STATE REQUESTS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PROOF-OF-CITIZEN-
SHIP INSTRUcTIONS ON THE NATIONAL MAIL VOTER REGISTRATION FORM 14 -20 (Jan. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF DECISION], available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/201401
17%20EAC%2OFinal%20Decision%20on%20Proof%20of%20Citizenship%2ORequests%20-%20FI
NAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
79. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
80. Id. at 2260.
81. Id. at 2261.
82. Id.
83. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 2270 (Alito, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2262.
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process," thereby allowing a State to verify that applicants meet its qualifi-
cations by whatever additional information it deems necessary.85  Accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, the Elections Clause is a general provision governed
by the more specific Voter Qualification Clause.86 Justice Thomas indi-
cated that he was "concerned" that the phrase "accept and use" would not
pass constitutional muster.87 However, Justice Thomas stated that he
would rely on the Voter Qualifications Clause rather than the majority's
interpretation under § 1973gg-7(b)(1) to avoid such a conflict.88
On the other hand, Justice Alito expressed the view that the presump-
tion against preemption present in a Supremacy Clause analysis should ap-
ply in Elections Clause cases.8 9 He reasoned that because States have the
ability to make regulations regarding the "time, places, and manner of fed-
eral elections" under the Elections Clause by default, the federalism con-
cerns underlying the presumption against preemption principle are far
more pervasive than what the majority would admit.90
PART IV: ANALYSIS
Before discussing the Supremacy Clause and the Elections Clause,
there are certain preliminary matters that must be addressed. It is first of
critical importance to realize that although the underlying issue in Inter
Tribal was a voter identification law (which springs forth numerous contro-
versies in its own right91 ), in order to be properly understood, Inter Tribal
must be classified as a preemption case involving federalism concerns. 92 It
is not a voter identification case, per se.93 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
85. Id at 2262-63 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 864-65 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 2266 (citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065,
2071 (2012)).
87. Id. at 2269.
88. Id. at 2269-70.
89. Id. at 2271-72 (Alito, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) (Alito, J., dissenting))).
91. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Common Cause/Ga. v.
Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009); League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758
(Ind. 2010).
92. See Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2256-57, 2263 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2271 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) ("... the federalism concerns underlying the presumption in the Supremacy Clause context are
somewhat weaker [in Elections Clause cases] .... [This case] ... raise[s] significant constitutional issues
concerning Congress's power to decide who may vote in federal elections."); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677
F.3d 383, 410 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) ("Our system of
dual sovereignty, which gives the state and federal governments the authority to operate within their
separate spheres, 'is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty.' . . . '[A] healthy bal-
ance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.' Despite our respect for the state's exercise of its sovereign authority, how-
ever, the Constitution's text requires us to safeguard the specific enumerated powers that are bestowed
on the federal government. The authority granted to Congress under the Elections Clause to 'make or
alter' state law regulating procedures for federal elections is one such power. The Framers of the Con-
stitution were clear that the states' authority to regulate federal elections extends only so far as Con-
gress declines to intervene.").
93. But see infra Part V.
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Tennessee recognized Inter Tribal as a distinct and separate preemption
case in its recent affirmation of a Tennessee voter identification law.9 4
Moreover, neither the Inter Tribal majority nor the dissent ever mentioned
Crawford. Arguably, if Inter Tribal truly centered on voter identification
laws, the Court would have at least mentioned Crawford-the case articu-
lating the test which is used to assess a voter identification law's constitu-
tionality. Further, in its en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit held that
Arizona's argument that its proof of citizenship requirement was not exces-
sively burdensome under Crawford "misses the mark."95 As noted by the
Ninth Circuit, Crawford considered whether an Indiana law imposed a sub-
stantial burden on the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, rather than whether a state law was preempted by a federal law
under an Elections Clause analysis.96
Contrary to Arizona's assertions, Inter Tribal has little to do with
HAVA.9 7 Arizona argued before the en banc Ninth Circuit that it had the
authority to enact Proposition 200, as HAVA only establishes minimum
requirements regarding voter registration.98 Arizona further argued that
since HAVA requires States to verify the applicant's driver's license or so-
cial security numbers submitted on the federal form, it must also have the
power to verify other information submitted with the federal form, such as
an applicant's citizenship claim.9 9 The Ninth Circuit was unpersuaded by
this contention in light of HAVA's savings clause that prohibits States from
"supersed[ing], restrict[ing], or limit[ing] the application of [the
NVRA]."' 00 The Supreme Court did not question this determination.
A. The Supremacy Clause"1
When one hears of a clash between a federal law and state law, one
might immediately (and correctly) think of preemption. Admittedly, one
might also be tempted to apply a Supremacy Clause analysis to the conflict,
as the Fifth Circuit has previously done. a°2 However, a careful reading of
the Court's jurisprudence reveals that the Supremacy Clause does not ap-
ply to all preemption cases.
The Supremacy Clause provides that "the Laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme law of the land;.., anything in the constitu-
tion or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."' 0' 3 As such,
94. City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 96 n.6 (Tenn. 2013).
95. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 401.
96. Id.
97. But see infra Part IV.A.
98. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 402.
99. Id. at 402-03.
100. Id. at 403 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15545(a) (2006)).
101. This section will demonstrate why the majority was correct in not applying the Supremacy
Clause in Inter Tribal.
102. Foster v. Love, 90 F.3d 1026 (5th Cir. 1996), affd, 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
103. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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"state laws that conflict with federal law are 'without effect.' , 10 4 In other
words, as a general principle, when state and federal laws are in conflict,
the federal law preempts the state law, as a federal law that passes constitu-
tional muster is supreme.1 °5 Preemption can be accomplished by Congress
under the Supremacy Clause "through a statute's express language or
through its structure and purpose."'1 6
When beginning a Supremacy Clause analysis, the Court first keeps
Congressional intent at the forefront. 107 Second, the Court "'assum[es]
that the"' federal law does not supersede the state law, unless there is a
"'clear and manifest purpose of Congress"' to supersede such law.108 With
these principles in mind, a court must then "fairly but-in light of the strong
presumption against pre-emption-narrowly construe the precise language
of [the statute]. . ." to determine if preemption is present.10 9
The presumption against preemption was formulated out of respect for
States' historic police powers based on the Supreme Court's respect "for
the States as 'independent sovereigns in our federal system."' 110 The Court
endeavors to maintain the "delicate balance" of power between the federal
government and the States by assuming that Congress does not excise its
preemption power lightly."' a Although the presumption against preemp-
tion is particularly prevalent "in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied," it applies to "all pre-emption cases" analyzed under the
Supremacy Clause.' 12 When a statute is susceptible to more than one plau-
sible reading, the Court ordinarily "'accept[s] the reading that disfavors
pre-emption.""' 3 Only when such laws cannot be construed harmoniously
must the state law give way.114
It was very clever for Arizona to assert the presumption against pre-
emption in Inter Tribal, as this may have saved its law had the Supremacy
Clause applied. Arizona wrongly assumed that the Supremacy Clause ap-
plied here and responded accordingly.1 5 Arizona was likely concerned
that its law would be preempted, as it was impossible to comply with both
104. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 746 (1981)).
105. See id.; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 129-31 (1824).
106. Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 76.
107. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996)).
108. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
109. Id. at 523.
110. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
111. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
112. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230))
(emphasis added); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
113. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S.
431, 432 (2005)).
114. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 392 (9th Cir. 2012).
115. Arizona could have also asserted the plain or clear statement rule, had the Supremacy Clause
applied. This rule is premised on the Tenth Amendment. When Congress "enact[s] legislation affecting
the balance in our federal system between the national and state governments [Congress] must by plain
statement make clear that it has duly deliberated the issue and fully intended to reach that result." In
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the NVRA and the Arizona law. 1 6 Arizona was also likely concerned that
its law impeded federal goals and objectives.
117
Under the Court's precedent, a state law may be implicitly preempted
by a federal law in the absence of an express preemption provision in the
federal law when there is a conflict between the laws. Such is the case here,
as the NVRA does not expressly preclude States from requiring additional
documentation.
A conflict exists for the purposes of implied preemption when it is
impossible to comply with both the federal and state law." 8 For example,
in McDermott v. Wisconsin,"9 the Court held that a state law prohibiting
the labeling of maple syrup in a manner that federal law required was pre-
empted by the federal law, as it was physically impossible to comply with
both laws.12 0 Additionally, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,'2 ' the Court inval-
idated a state law that would have divided railroad retirement income in
divorce cases when federal law prohibited the same.'22
Not all cases are as straightforward, however. Cases where it is possi-
ble that Congress has established merely minimum requirements are espe-
cially difficult for courts. 23 Minimum federal requirements allow States to
impose stricter standards. Thus, the issue becomes whether the federal law
establishes minimum or exclusive standards. 124 In Florida Lime, the Court
reiterated that Congressional intent is paramount in this determination.
125
Florida Lime involved federal regulations that measured the maturity
of avocados.' 26 California adopted a more stringent rule, which resulted in
Florida avocados in compliance with federal regulations becoming illegal
for the purposes of sale or transportation under California law. 127 The
Court held that the federal regulations were minimum requirements. 28
When determining Congressional intent, the Court found that such regula-
tions were the result of campaign efforts by Florida avocado growers "to
promote orderly competition ... 129
re Brentwood Outpatient, Ltd., 43 F.3d 256, 264 (6th Cir. 1994); see Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565; see also
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61.
116. Provided, of course, that one accepts the majority's interpretation of "accept and use."
117. As we now know from Inter Tribal, even if the Supremacy Clause did apply here and the
Court was unpersuaded by Arizona's presumption against preemption and plain statement rule argu-
ments, Arizona may have been able to successfully assert that the NVRA is unconstitutional as applied
here under the Voter Qualifications Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment by arguing that preempt-
ing Arizona's law would not allow Arizona to enforce its own voter qualifications requirements.
118. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
119. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
120. Id. at 124-26, 133-34, 137.
121. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
122. Id. at 577-79, 590.
123. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 132.
124. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 420 (4th ed. 2011).
125. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 151, 172, 175.
126. Id. at 133-34.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 152.
129. Id. at 151.
[VOL. 33:235
2014]FEDERALISM, ELECTIONS, PREEMPTION, AND SUPREMACY 247
This line of cases indicates that the Court was correct in finding that
Arizona's law conflicted with, and was therefore preempted by, the
NVRA, albeit using an Elections Clause analysis. 130 Just as it was physi-
cally impossible to comply with both the federal and state law regarding the
labeling of maple syrup in McDermott, as well as to comply with both the
federal and state law regarding railroad retirement income in Hisquierdo, it
was physically impossible to comply with both the NVRA and Arizona's
law in Inter Tribal.'31 Indeed, as stated by the Ninth Circuit, the NVRA
required an Arizona "county recorder to accept and use the [f]ederal
[f]orm to register voters for federal elections "3.... "I The federal form
does not require proof of U.S. citizenship. Yet, at the same time, Arizona's
law requires that a county recorder reject the federal form "as insufficient
for voter registration if the form does not include proof of U.S.
citizenship.133
As Justice Alito highlighted, another way of looking at Inter Tribal
would be to say that the phrase "accept and use" is ambiguous. 34135 As
Judge Rawlinson stated, when interpreting a statute, courts first consider
the plain meaning of the law.'36 Unfortunately, this is not particularly
helpful here, as the phrase "accept and use" could have two meanings: i.e.
the NVRA sets either the minimum or the exclusive standard. Judge Rawl-
inson adopted Arizona's proffered interpretation that it must only use the
federal form to some extent in the voter registration process by relying
heavily on § 1973gg-4(a)(2). 37 This section allows States to develop a state
form, as long as it contains the same information as the federal form.
138
Judge Rawlinson is correct that the NVRA neither expressly prohibits
States from requiring additional information nor does any provision in the
NVRA hold that States must use only the information contained in the
federal form, making Arizona's interpretation plausible' 39-at first. Indeed,
130. I condition this statement on the fact that the Court provided Arizona with a means to en-
force its voter qualifications. This Note will further argue that the Court was correct in analyzing this
case using the Elections Clause. See infra Part IV.D.
131. Of course, if the NVRA only established minimum requirements, it would have been possi-
ble to comply with both federal and state law, as Arizona would have "accept[ed] and use[d] the federal
form" as part of the voter registration process.
132. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 398 (9th Cir. 2012).
133. Id.
134. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2270 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
135. Justice Kennedy stated that the "accept and use" provision is unambiguous. Id. at 2261
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He was mistaken.
136. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Gonzalez,
677 F.3d at 445-46 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (citing Siripongs v. Davis, 282 F.3d 755, 758 (9th Cir.
2002)).
137. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 444-45.
138. Justice Alito would have adopted a more "compromised" approach; he would have held that
Arizona must "us[el the form as a meaningful part of the registration processes." Inter Tribal, 133 S.
Ct. at 2274 (Alito, J., dissenting). As held by Justice Scalia, this "meaningful part" standard is as amor-
phous as it is unworkable. Id. at 2255 n.3.
139. Even Justice Scalia concedes this. Id. at 2254.
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§ 1973gg-7(b) uses the term "shall include," which allows States to add re-
quirements to their respective state forms, provided they comply with
§ 1973gg-7(b). That is to say that States could require proof of citizenship
on their state forms for federal elections purposes, so long as they require
that voters include their signature under penalty of perjury. However, this
does not mean that States may reject the federal form, as this would lead to
absurd results by rendering the federal form meaningless.14
Yet, Chief Judge Kozinski offered a "belt and suspenders" analogy in
his concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit decision for allowing States to
require documentation confirming the contents of the federal form.14' This
would further safeguard against fraudulent voter registrations. While this
may at first seem appealing, this approach would render the form redun-
dant and unnecessary, as well as go against one of Congress' stated purpose
of enacting the NVRA by making it harder to use the form and harder to
register to vote in general. Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski's inclusion of the
legislative history to the NVRA is more than appropriate in light of the
ambiguities present here. 42 Congress expressly rejected the notion that
States could require "presentation of documentary evidence of citizenship
of an applicant for voter registration.114 3144 It is particularly noteworthy
that the Court did not question Judge Kozinski's use of such history. While
it may be that the Court did not feel the need to discuss this concurring
opinion, one cannot help but speculate that some members of the majority
were influenced by it, as Judge Kozinski's opinion supports the majority's
conclusion. 45
If anything, Judge Kozinski's concurring opinion makes it clear that
Congress needed to include greater specificity and clarity in the NVRA.
While it could certainly be said that Arizona's law enhances two other pur-
poses of the NVRA by helping "to ensure that accurate and current voter
registration rolls are maintained," and "to protect the integrity of the elec-
toral process, the Court, in affirming the Ninth Circuit, implicitly held
that Congress already provided sufficient safeguards in the NVRA to fur-
ther the NVRA's stated goals.
147
Arizona's law also impedes federal objectives by making it harder to
register to vote. When a state law interferes with the goals, objectives, and
purposes of Congress when enacting the federal law, a state law is deemed
140. Id. at 2255-56; Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 399.
141. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 439-40 (Kozinski, J. concurring).
142. Id. at 440-41.
143. Id. at 440 (citing 139 Cong. Rec. 5098 (Mar. 16, 1993)); H.R. Rep. No. 103-66, at 23 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 140, 148 (Conf. Rep.).
144. Contrary to the beliefs of Congress, a state must be allowed to add state-specific require-
ments to the federal form that are necessary to enforce its voter qualifications. See infra Part V. How-
ever, this does not justify a state flat-out rejecting the federal form, as Congress has the authority to set
the times, places, and manner of federal elections. See supra Part II.A.; see also infra Part IV.B, Part V.
145. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 441 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-66, at 23-24
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 140, 148-49).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006).
147. See Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 403.
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to be preempted.148 Unlike the federal regulations in Florida Lime and
contrary to the contentions of Judge Rawlinson and Justice Thomas,149
Congress intended for the NVRA to be the standard, not just the minimum
standard. 150 151 Congress' main intent was to streamline the voter registra-
tion process in federal elections; Congress wanted to "assume exclusive
control of the whole subject."'5 2
Arizona's law is similar to other state laws that the Court has deemed
to impede federal objectives. In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission,
the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act preempted a Florida
law that disqualified the filer of an unfair labor practice charge from unem-
ployment compensation. 53 The Court emphasized that the Florida law
went against a key goal of Congress-for filers "to be completely free from
coercion against reporting [unfair practices].... 154 Further, in Perez v.
Campbell, the Court held that an Arizona state motor vehicle law, which
provided for the suspension of the driver's licenses of judgment debtor-
defendants involved in automobile accidents, was preempted by a federal
bankruptcy law. 55 The Court held that Congress' goal was to give debtors
"freedom from most kinds of preexisting tort judgments" and that the state
law ran contrary to this.'56 Like the state law in Nash, which frustrated
Congress' goal of encouraging whistleblowing, and the state law in Perez,
which frustrated Congress' goal of providing a fresh start to debtors, the
Arizona law in Inter Tribal frustrates Congress' goal of "increase[ing] the
number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal
office" '15 7 when enacting NVRA.'58 Indeed, Arizona's law directly inhibits
this.' 59 This goal is further evidenced by the enactment of HAVA1
60 1 6 1
148. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941);
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971)).
149. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 445-46, 449 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council
of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2262 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. See supra Part IV; see also Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2254.
151. As held by the Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, when Congress rejects language that would
have resulted in a party's proffered interpretation of a statute, such rejection weighs heavily against that
interpretation. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2006).
152. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383 (1879).
153. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967).
154. Id. at 238.
155. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971).
156. Id. at 648.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (b) (2006).
158. Over 31,000 applicants were "unable (initially) to register to vote because of Proposition
200" between January 2005 and September 2007. Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. 06-CV-1268. slip op. at 13
(D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2008). Only about thirty percent (11,000) of these applicants were subsequently
allowed to register. Id. at 14.
159. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2275 (2013) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 400-01 (9th Cir. 2012).
160. See Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 505 (1986) (indicating
that the presence of other federal statutes on related topics can shed light on Congressional goals for
preemption purposes). One of HAVA's stated goals was "to establish minimum election administration
standards ... for the administration of Federal elections .. " 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2006).
161. 1 include this point as further evidence that the majority was correct in finding that Arizona's
law was preempted by the NVRA. This may at first appear to be inconsistent with Justice Scalia's
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B. The Elections Clause162
Inter Tribal stands for the proposition that Congress has broad author-
ity to regulate federal elections by virtue of the Elections Clause.163 There
is good reason for this, as the Elections Clause expressly allows "Congress
to 'make or alter' state elections regulations. ' 164 The Elections Clause pro-
vides that "[t]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding [federal elections]16
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. . .. "166 The
Framers decided to vest such great authority in the federal government out
of concerns that States would threaten the very existence of our nation by
failing to hold federal elections.167 The Elections Clause was also designed
to discourage voter disenfranchisement by preventing unequal representa-
tion in Congress.168169
In a footnote, Justice Scalia equated the Elections Clause to the Com-
merce Clause; he said that "all action under the Elections Clause displaces
holding that the EAC could be forced to include Arizona's verification requirements to the federal
form: i.e. because the NVRA was designed to facilitate voting and because the Arizona law interferes
with this goal, it necessarily follows that the latter must be preempted. However, a federal law must
pass constitutional muster if it is to have preemptive effect. Thus, if it were found that the NVRA
prohibits Arizona from enforcing its voter qualifications, the NVRA would be unconstitutional as ap-
plied here. See supra Part III.C.
162. This section demonstrates that the majority was correct in finding that Arizona's law was
preempted under the Elections Clause.
163. See Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2257.
164. Id. at 2256-57.
165. As stated by Judge Posner, the Elections Clause does not mention Presidential elections, as
the Framers did not contemplate general elections for the office of the President. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs.
for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995). However, Article II, section 1 of
the Constitution states that "Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day
on which they shall give their Votes. ... This gives Congress the power to regulate Presidential
elections, which is done through the Electoral College. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545,
547-48 (1934).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
167. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 390 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808-09 (1995); THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 168 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ron P.
Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981)); THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter,
ed., 1961); James Madison, Convention Debates, reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Virginia, No. 3) 1260 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993).
168. James Madison, Convention Debates, supra note 165 at 1260.
169. The Voter Qualifications Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment work in tandem with the
Elections Clause-they provide explicit support for the notion that States can establish their own respec-
tive voter qualifications in federal elections. James Madison stated that allowing Congress to set elector
qualifications violated "a fundamental article of republican government." THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at
325-26 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). In Oregon v. Mitchell, five Justices held that the
Elections Clause did not allow Congress to regulate voter qualifications in federal elections. Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 143 (opinion of Douglas, J.); Id. at 210 (opinion of Harlan, J.); Id. at 288 (opin-
ion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.); see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462
(1991); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 227-29 (1986); Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform
Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Framers created a true system of
checks and balances-state legislatures could not destroy Congress without destroying themselves. Ed-
gar, 56 F.3d at 794.
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some element of a pre-existing state regulatory regime... ,170 but Con-
gressional actions taken under the Commerce Clause do "not always impli-
cate concurrent state power .... ",171 Thus, implicitly, Inter Tribal states
that Congress' power under the Elections Clause is greater than that of
even the Commerce Clause. vE While this may appear to be quite expan-
sive,173 it is really just a reiteration of prior precedents.174
Historically, the Court has always held, in one form or another, that
Congress has broad authority under the Elections Clause. Numerous cases
are illustrative of this. In Ex parte Siebold,171 the Court held that Congress
could "assume the entire control and regulation of the election of repre-
sentatives" 176 and that Congress "has a general supervisory power over the
whole subject" under the Elections Clause. 177 When Congress passes a law
under the Elections Clause that comports with all other provisions of the
Constitution, any state regulation to the contrary is superseded. 78 How-
ever, unlike the Supremacy Clause, there is no presumption against pre-
emption in Elections Clause cases, as Congress is not "regulating an area
'traditionally occupied by the States."' 179180 While States' rights are cer-
tainly worthy of respect in this area,"' such rights have always been sub-
servient to Congressional oversight. 182  For this reason, Justice Kennedy
and Justice Alito's call for applying the presumption against preemption in
Elections Clause cases must fail. 83 Indeed, as stated by the Sixth Circuit,
the Elections Clause "treats States as election administrators rather than
sovereign entities.
184
Subsequent to Siebold, the Court continued to hold that Congress'
power under the Elections Clause was broad. In 1932, the Court in Smiley
v. Holm,185 held that the Elections Clause allowed Congress "to provide a
170. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 n.6 (2013).
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. One commentator called Inter Tribal "the most expansive account to date of federal power
under the Elections Clause." Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127
HARV. L. REV. 95, 111 (2013).
174. Admittedly, the Court has never compared the Commerce Clause and the Elections Clause
in such a manner before.
175. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (holding the Congress could compel the selection of
district representatives).
176. Id. at 396.
177. Id. at 387; see Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
178. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 384.
179. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 392 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 108 (2000)); see supra Part IV.A.
180. See supra Part IV.A.
181. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 394.
182. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013) (citing Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)).
183. Justice Kennedy would have applied the same "cautionary principle" in all preemption cases.
Some prior decisions have referred to this principle as a "presumption against preemption." See, e.g.,
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992).
184. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Re-
form Now (ACORN) v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997)).
185. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
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complete code for congressional elections . . in relation to . . . registra-
tion .... 186187 In 1934, the Court held in Burroughs v. United States that
Congress had the power to regulate Presidential and Vice Presidential elec-
tions.188 In 1941, the Court held that Congress had the authority to regu-
late primary elections and political party nominations procedures in United
States v. Classic.'89 Moreover, in 1946, the Court again held that Congress
is given "exclusive control" over federal election procedures in Colegrove v.
Green.19° The Court further held that Congress could force the States to
allow eighteen-year-olds to vote in Oregon v. Mitchell in 1970.191 In 1972,
the Court held that Congress could regulate recounts in Roudebush v.
Hartke. 92 In Buckley v. Valeo, a 1976 decision, the Court acknowledged
that it was "well established" that Congress could regulate campaigns lead-
ing up to federal elections under the Elections Clause, so long as such regu-
lations were consistent with the First Amendment.193 In 1995, the Court
indicated in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton that Congress had the
power to override state regulations on federal elections. 194 Finally, in 1997,
the Court held that Congress had the power to set a national date on which
federal elections must be held. 195
Lower courts have also embraced this broad interpretation of Con-
gressional power under the Elections Clause. Indeed, prior to Siebold, one
court said of the Elections Clause: "There is little regarding an election that
is not included in the terms, time, place and manner of holding it."' 96 More
recently, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit noted that "Congress [is]
given the whip hand" when acting pursuant to its powers under the Elec-
tions Clause and that Congress could compel the States to pay the expense
of the federal scheme. 97 19 8 During the same year, the Ninth Circuit held
186. Id. at 366 (emphasis added); see United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250
F. Supp. 330, 351-55 (E.D. La.1965).
187. Justice Thomas argued that this was merely dicta, as Smiley involved Congressional redistrict-
ing, rather than voter registration and that two subsequent cases (Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25
(1972) and Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001)) had simply quoted the term "registration" from
Smiley. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2268 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While this may be true, it does not
negate the fact that the Court has always held that Congress has broad authority in the area of how
federal elections are held.
188. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545, 547-48 (1934).
189. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941).
190. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (emphasis added).
191. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
192. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1972).
193. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 13 (1976).
194. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832-34, 864 (1995). This statement could be
dicta, however, as Thornton involved a state's regulation regarding the qualifications necessary to be-
come a member of Congress.
195. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 68-72 (1997).
196. United States v. Munford, 16 F. 223, 228 (E.D.Va. 1883).
197. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. For Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis added).
198. Judge Posner further noted that the Elections Clause does not mention voter registration, as
this "did not exist in the eighteenth century as a separate stage of the electoral process." Id. at 793.
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that Congress could "conscript state agencies" to implement federal regula-
tion.1 99 The Sixth Circuit subsequently noted that the Elections Clause al-
lowed Congress "to force states to alter their regulations regarding federal
elections. '' 2°  Eleven years later, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the
Elections Clause stood "in stark contrast to virtually all other provisions of
the Constitution, which merely tell the states 'not what they must do but
what they can or cannot do."201 Rather, the Elections Clause commands
that States "prescribe the details necessary to hold congressional
elections.,
2 02
The Framers originally intended that Congressional power under the
Elections Clause was to be "expressly restricted to the regulation of the
times, the places, the manner of elections."2 3 Alexander Hamilton as-
serted that "every government ought to contain in itself the means of its
own preservation." However, as stated by Judge Posner, "laws frequently
outrun their rationales. The [Elections Clause] is broadly worded and has
been broadly interpreted. Nor is it certain that its rationale is as limited as
Hamilton suggested.
20 4
Consistent with Judge Posner's statement and the express terms of the
Constitution, the Court has made it clear that it will not strain the natural
reading of statutes when performing an analysis under the Elections Clause
in order to avoid preemption, unlike a Supremacy Clause analysis. 20 5 In
Foster, a Louisiana statute provided that an open primary would occur in
October to determine party candidates for the United States House of
Representatives and for the Senate.20 6 Yet, federal law provided that Con-
gressional elections would occur on the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November.20 7 Louisiana argued that its law related to the "manner" of
electing candidates for federal office, rather than the "time" that such elec-
tions take place. 208 Thus, according to Louisiana, the federal law and the
state law at issue regulated different areas. The Court characterized Loui-
siana's argument as "merely wordplay" and an "imaginative characteriza-
tion. "209 The Court declined to strip the statutes down to their
"definitional bone. ' 210 Thus, the Court's unwillingness to harmonize the
NVRA and the Arizona law is consistent with the broad authority of Con-
gress and numerous prior precedents.
199. Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Exparte Siebold, 100
U.S. 384, 386 (1879)).
200. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997).
201. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Edgar, 56 F.3d at 794).
202. Id.
203. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 271 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961) (empha-
sis omitted).
204. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. For Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995).
205. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 72-73 (1997).
206. Id. at 70.
207. Id. at 68.
208. Id. at 72.
209. Id. at 72-73.
210. Id. at 72.
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PART V: SIGNIFICANCE
The Court makes clear in Inter Tribal that States determine who is
eligible to vote in federal elections notwithstanding the Elections Clause.
Moreover, the Court rightly intended to preserve States' rights. Inter Tri-
bal also adds significant clarification to the Court's preemption jurispru-
dence that Congress may only use the Elections Clause to preempt state
regulations insofar as they apply to federal elections.211 Arizona, as well as
any other State, is free to impose proof of citizenship requirements for
voter registrations in state elections 12 under the Voter Qualifications
Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment even when Congress decides to
use its Election Clause power.2 13 Yet, as stated by Justice Alito and Judge
Rawlinson in the dissenting opinion to the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision,
the practical application of this principle results in a burdensome undertak-
ing for States; States may choose to concurrently register voters in state
and federal elections, as Arizona had previously done in Inter Tribal, rather
than maintain separate state and federal registration procedures and sepa-
rate state and federal voter rolls.214
Inter Tribal further demonstrates the difficulty of attempting to apply
universal standards regarding voter registration and voter identification
laws. For example, suppose that Congress, in an attempt to quell modern-
day voter identification law controversies, amends the NVRA to require
national voter identification in all elections using futuristic technology
(such as the scanning of thumbprints, hair follicle tests, voice recognition
devices, and retinal scans).2 15 This, in and of itself, would be unconstitu-
tional under Inter Tribal, as States may decide who may vote in elections
under the Voter Qualifications Clause, as well as the Seventeenth Amend-
ment.216 However, under the Elections Clause, Congress could amend the
NVRA to require States to verify the eligibility of voters under state law
using thumbprints, hair follicle tests, voice recognition devices, and retinal
scans for the purposes of federal elections.2 17
211. See supra Part I; Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 404 n.30 (9th Cir. 2012).
212. Arizona's Attorney General recently issued an advisory opinion indicating that it would be
permissible under federal and Arizona law for Arizona to establish separate voter rolls for state and
federal elections. Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. 113-011 (R13-016) (2013).
213. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258-60 (2013) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII)); Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 2272
(Alito, J., dissenting); Gonzalez, 677 F.3d, at 404 n.30.
214. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2272 (Alito, J., dissenting); Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 449 (Rawlinson,
J., dissenting); see id. at 404 n.30.
215. I recognize that this hypothetical may be prohibitively expensive and impact federalism, indi-
vidual rights, and privacy rights, among other things. Right or wrong however, using such technologies
in the voting process is likely the way of the future. How the Court's jurisprudence will eventually
evolve to allow this remains to been seen. I hope that when this is accomplished, it will be done in a
manner that preserves States' rights and individual rights to the fullest extent possible.
216. See supra Part III.C, Part IV.B.
217. See supra Part III.C, Part IV.B.
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The reader must understand that there are questions arising out of
Inter Tribal that still remain. Although the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the NVRA,218 it remains to be seen whether the EAC's recent ac-
tions are constitutional. 219 The key issue is whether the oath prescribed by
the federal form is sufficient for Arizona to enforce its voter qualifications:
i.e. that a prospective voter is a United States citizen.220 Justice Thomas
would have held that a State could "verify citizenship in any way it deems
necessary. '"221 Justice Alito made a similar argument.222 Justice Scalia indi-
cated during the oral argument of Inter Tribal that an oath in this context
was "virtually meaningless. '223 Yet, Justice Scalia's opinion is far less clear
as to whether the EAC must automatically approve a State's request to add
state-specific instructions to the federal form. 2 4 While the Court makes it
clear that it would "raise serious constitutional doubts" if Arizona could
not "enforce its voter qualifications, 225 the Court goes on to suggest that
Arizona bears the burden of proof with regard to establishing that a change
to the federal form is warranted.226 The EAC determined, rightly or
wrongly, that Arizona had failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
the additional proof-of-citizenship instructions to the federal form. 27 Yet,
the District Court of Kansas recently held that inasmuch as States have the
power to establish voter qualifications under the Voter Qualifications
Clause, Arizona's legislature was free to decide that a mere oath was insuf-
ficient to satisfy its citizenship requirement to vote without more. 2 8 How
218. The Court interpreted § 1973gg-7(b)(1) so as to allow States to enforce their respective voter
qualifications. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2259; Id. at 2270 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, even the
United States conceded during the oral argument of Inter Tribal that § 1973gg-7(b)(1) allows States to
enforce their respective voter qualifications. Id. at 2259 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 52). Justice Thomas's
criticism of the majority's refusal to settle the conflict between federal and state power in this area is
well taken. Justice Scalia's opinion is certainly a roundabout way of allowing States to enforce their
respective voter qualifications. Yet, it was probably best to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance
here in order to build a record on whether Arizona truly needs this voter identification law in order to
enforce its voter qualifications.
219. After Inter Tribal was decided, Arizona renewed its request to add state-specific instructions
to the federal form. The EAC deferred this request until such a time as the EAC had a quorum of
commissioners. Arizona, along with the state of Kansas, filed suit, challenging the validity of the defer-
ral. The EAC subsequently denied Arizona's request on January 17, 2014. MEMORANDUM OF DECI-
SION, supra note 78, at 3-4.
220. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2260.
221. Id. at 2269-70.
222. Id. at 2270, 2273.
223. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION, supra note 78, at 29.
224. See id. at 26-27.
225. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2258.
226. Id. at 2260 ("Arizona would have the opportunity to establish in a reviewing court that a
mere oath will not suffice to effectuate its citizenship requirement .... ) (emphasis added). The South-
ern District Court of Texas recently interpreted Inter Tribal in the same fashion in an unrelated case.
Veasey v. Perry, 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 3002413, at *14 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2014).
227. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION, supra note 78, at 26-41.
228. Kobach v. EAC, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1271 (D. Kan. 2014).
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the Tenth Circuit's response to Arizona's challenge to the EAC's determi-
nation will influence the evolution of the Court's jurisprudence in this area
remains to be seen.2 9
For now, it is noteworthy that Inter Tribal appears to have the effect of
repudiating a portion of at least one other decision. Inter Tribal holds that
States have the ability to say who may vote in federal and state elections
and that the Elections Clause cannot be used to change that principle. Yet,
the majority makes no mention of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This
would seem to run afoul of United States v. Classic, which held that States
could establish voter qualifications under the Voter Qualifications Clause,
but that this authority was subject to the Elections Clause. Additionally,
the Court stated that Congress' power under the Elections Clause could be
read together with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 3 ° Justice Thomas's
opinion is exactly the opposite of the decision in Classic; he states that the
more "general" Elections Clause is subject to the more "specific" Voter
Qualifications Clause. Justice Thomas, like the majority, makes no men-
tion of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Yet, Judge Posner indicated that
the Necessary and Proper Clause displayed the extensive reach of Con-
gress' power under the Elections Clause.231 Since Justice Scalia cited Clas-
sic for the notion that Congress' authority under the Elections Clause is
232broad,2  one might reasonably infer that the majority's omission of the
Necessary and Proper Clause was a mere oversight. Yet, the majority
made it clear that it would not be bound by implicit regulations when there
are explicit regulations to the contrary.233 Here, the Elections Clause is
explicit on Congress' power, while the Necessary and Proper Clause is an
implicit provision that is tied to Congress' explicit power. Justice Thomas's
"specific governs the general" principle might be applied here.234 Since the
Elections Clause is specific with regard to Congress' power in this area, it
must necessarily follow that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a more
general provision. Indeed, even Classic indicates that the Necessary and
Proper Clause is a general provision in this context.235 In any event, the
point is that the Necessary and Proper Clause is no longer expressly appli-
cable to an Elections Clause preemption analysis.
229. The Tenth Circuit held oral arguments on August 25, 2014. See Order Granting Intervenors
Defendants Appellants' Request to Release the Oral Argument Recording, Kobach v. EAC and Inter
Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. (Nos. 14-3062 & 14-3072) (10th Cir. filed Sept. 2, 2014), http://moritzlaw
.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Kobachl38.pdf. As of October 29, 2014, no decision has
been issued.
230. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
231. Ass'n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)).
232. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013).
233. Id. at 2258 ("One cannot read the Elections Clause as treating implicitly what ... other
constitutional provisions regulate explicitly.").
234. Id. at 2266 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank,132 S.Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384
(1992)) ("'[It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general."').
235. Classic, 313 U.S. at 315.
[VOL. 33:235
2014]FEDERALISM, ELECTIONS, PREEMPTION, AND SUPREMACY 257
PART VI: CONCLUSION
Inter Tribal is a preemption case that deals with federalism concerns
and the extent of federal and state power involving voter registration and
identification. While the underlying issue in Inter Tribal was the constitu-
tionality of a voter identification law, this case is far more than just a voter
identification case. Inter Tribal deals with the delicate balance of power
between the federal and state governments-when, where, and how, or the
"manner" in which federal elections are held must be determined by Con-
gress in order to prevent voter disenfranchisement and to force States to
hold federal elections. Without federal elections, Congress could not exist.
Yet, pursuant to the Voter Qualifications Clause and the Seventeenth
Amendment, States must be able to establish who may vote in both federal
and state elections. All justices upheld this proposition-and for good rea-
son. Allowing the federal government to establish elector qualifications
would put States at the mercy of Congress. This system of checks and bal-
ances is necessary for the preservation of our nation. This notion is well-
established by prior precedents, as well as the Framers' intent. It was
rightly upheld by all members of the Court. If States or the federal govern-
ment became too powerful, we would cease to live in a republic. Rather,
we would live in a country full of tyranny and oppression.
Justices Kennedy and Alito's disagreement with the majority's refusal
to apply the presumption against preemption principle used in a
Supremacy Clause analysis to an Elections Clause case is inconsistent with
prior precedents, the intent of the Framers, and the express provisions of
the Constitution. There is a reason why there is both a Supremacy Clause
and an Elections Clause in the Constitution. An analysis under the former
incorporates respect for States' historic police powers, while an analysis
under the latter gives Congress, in the words of Judge Posner, "the whip
hand" regarding federal elections-an area where States have no inher-
ently reserved power. Congress has always correctly held broad authority
under the Elections Clause.
There was understandably some disagreement about the meaning of
the phrase "accept and use" in the NVRA. This phrase could have meant
that States must use the federal form as a part of the voter registration
process, or that States must accept and use the federal form to the exclusion
of all other materials. However, when one considers the neighboring provi-
sions of the NVRA, the legislative history of the NVRA, and the fact that
the Arizona law would interfere with the Congressional goal of streamlin-
ing the voter registration process by making it more difficult to register to
vote, as well as make the federal form redundant and unnecessary, the ma-
jority was correct to accept Justice Scalia's position. His interpretation cor-
rectly upholds the NVRA, while at the same time allows Arizona to
enforce its voter qualifications (though in a roundabout way).
Finally, Inter Tribal adds significant clarification to the Court's pre-
emption jurisprudence and demonstrates the difficulty of attempting to ap-
ply national standards for voter identification and registration. While this
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case may have the effect of repudiating a portion of a prior decision of the
Court in Classic, the majority still preserved the delicate balance of power
between the federal and state governments. This, in one form or another,
is surely what our founding Fathers intended.
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